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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Jurisdiction is vested with the Utah Court of Appeals by Utah

Code Ann. § 78-2A-3(2)(i)(1994).

RULES, STATUTES. AND OTHER AUTHORITIES
The authorities considered to be determinative of the issues
3

raised in this appeal include Utah R. App. P. 11(e) (2); Utah R.
App. P. 24(h); Berry v. Berry, 635 P.2d 68 (Utah 1981); Cox v.
Cox, 877 P.2d 1262 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Rawlinas, 829
P.2d 150 (Utah App. 1992); State v. $9,199.00, 791 P.2d 2213
(Utah App. 1990); 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 896
(1990). Citations will occur in the text of Defendant's Brief.
Certain of the authorities referred to in this Brief are
reproduced, in their entirety, in the addendums of the Brief of
the Respondents and the Brief of the Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal was taken by the plaintiff, Carolyn Endrody
("Plaintiff"), from a Judgment and Decree entered on October
3rd, 1994, in the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for
Iron County, State of Utah, by the Honorable J. Philip Eves.
The case is essentially a divorce case, involving issues of
property division and alimony.

In addition, the Plaintiff

claims that she is entitled to a distribution of the assets of
the Endrody Trust.
Plaintiff has failed to show, by citation to the record or
otherwise, that the issues raised in her Brief were preserved
at the trial court level, as required by Rule 24(a)(5) of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

In addition, Defendant/

Appellee Laszlo Endrody, Jr. ("Defendant") disputes the facts
set forth under the heading "Statement of the Case" in
4

Plaintiff's Brief.

These facts misstate, mischaracterize, and

take out of context the
trial.

evidence placed before the court at

Accordingly, to help address any issues that Plaintiff

may have raised in this case and answer Plaintiff's Brief,
Defendant will explain the facts that were proven and fully
documented during the trial.

Properties in Question
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

The Endrody Ranch - 643.77 acres with water
The Home in Cedar City, Utah
The Home at 3 600 North, Enoch, Utah
The Home in Garden Park, Enoch, Utah
The five (5) acres in Enoch, Utah
Cattle of Laszlo Endrody, Jr.; contempt finding
Farm Equipment
Endrody Trucking
Antenuptial Agreement
Retirement

11. Income & Debt
1.

The Ranch was purchased by LASZLO ENDRODY, SR., and MATILDA

ENDRODY, Defendant's parents, for $80,000 in 1970.

They paid

$25,000 down and made all the payments until the note was paid
in full.

The Ranch included 643.77 acres with water rights,

wells, fences, ranch buildings, corrals and pumps.
Defendant, LASZLO ENDRODY, JR., was deeded one-third (1/3)
interest with Full Rights of Survivorship with the
understanding that he will bring his cattle in from Nevada and
rent the Farm Land from his parents.

He was to farm the land

and he would eventually inherit the Ranch.
Defendant's parents purchased their home, a double-wide house
5

trailer, permanently installed and roofed over.

They drilled a

third well, installed garden sprinklers, built garage, horse
coral and landscaped.

They spent $45,000 in 1970.

Defendant's

mother, MATILDA ENDRODY, still resides on the Ranch.
Defendant's parents worked this Ranch for twenty-two (22)
years, full time.

Defendant worked the Ranch six (6) months of

each year from 1970 to 1975.

From 1975 to 1979, Defendant came

to the Ranch one (1) month each year.

After 1979 Defendant

worked the Ranch five (5) months each year.

PATTY and BILL

HEINZ worked the Ranch three (3) years, full time.

PAUL

McGARVEY (Grandson) worked the Ranch eleven (11) years while he
lived with his grandparents.

LES D. ENDRODY worked the Ranch

when needed.
Ten (10) years ago on October 5, 1984, LASZLO ENDRODY, SR.
and MATILDA ENDRODY formed the Endrody Trust as Grantors.
Defendant quit-claimed his one-third (1/3) interest to them by
signing the deed over in exchange for his shares and his
children's shares in the Trust.
first Trustee.

Defendant was appointed as the

The beneficiaries were the family members that

helped the Grantors the most; later, all family members were
recognized and received shares.
Grantors retained the right to cancel the Trust at any time
during their lives, should they desire.
Defendant, LASZLO ENDRODY, JR., became the first Trustee.
While serving as Trustee, he managed the Trust in accordance
6

with the Trust Agreement under the watchful eyes of both
Grantors.

Grantor, LASZLO, SR., kept the books and Grantor,

MATILDA ENDRODY, is still helping with the bills for second
Trustee, PATTY HEINZ.
It was never established at the trial how much money Grantors
spent towards the improvements or how much cash the Trust
started with or how much of their own funds they were feeding
into the Ranch.
After this lawsuit against the Trust started, Defendant was
asked by the beneficiaries to step down from being Trustee.
Dr. Bruce McGarvey, the appointed stand-by Trustee, could not
take over due to his job in Canada.
elected as Trustee.
the election.

PATTY R. HEINZ was then

Trust Attorney, W. KENT CORRY, conducted

Judge J. Philip Eves, Fifth District Court of

Iron County, determined that she was properly appointed as
Trustee.
2.

The home in Cedar City, Utah, was purchased by Defendant

and Plaintiff and deeded to their two (2) children, MICHAEL A.
ENDRODY and LINDA S. ENDRODY.

Defendant and Plaintiff became

the Trustees for the minor children.
Plaintiff wanted the home in her children's names to bring
them even with Defendant's three (3) children that owned cattle
and other assets.
Later, when the Trust was formed, Plaintiff wanted to put the
home into the Trust.

For this she received seventy (70) shares
7

(newly formed).

This brought Plaintiff and her two (2)

children even with Defendant's children from his first
marriage.
The home then became Trust property, deeded to the Trust.
The Trust paid the taxes, improvements, insurance and
maintenance.
Ten (10) years ago, Plaintiff gave her half (1/2) of this
house to her minor children along with Defendant's half.
she granted the home to the Endrody Trust.
arm to do so.

Later

No one twisted her

At the same time she demonstrated that she fully

approved and acknowledged the Endrody Trust.
3.

The Enoch home on 3 600 North was purchased by the Endrody

Trust and was deeded to the Trust.

The Trust paid the taxes,

insurance, improvements and made the payments.
The home was rented out to Defendant and family for $850.00
per month.
The reason Plaintiff was evicted from the home after the
divorce was that she would not pay rent.
per month.

The rent was $85 0.0 0

This is an eighteen (18) room house.

Plaintiff

rented out part of the house and kept the rent money, outright
stealing from the Trust.

This home was never hers.

is still making the house payments.
make the payments.

The Trust

The rent was needed to

To stay in that house rent-free for three

(3) years was not fair.

That is why the trial Judge awarded

one-half of the rent for two (2) years--$10,200.00--to be paid
8

by Plaintiff to the Trust.

Defendant was ordered to pay the

other half.
4.

The home in Garden Park was purchased by the Trust and

was deeded to the Trust.

The Trust paid the taxes, insurance,

improvements, maintenance and the house payments.

Basically,

this was to be rental property to be rented out to
beneficiaries and others.
When PATTY HEINZ became Trustee, she sold the house before
the Trust and the beneficiaries were pulled into this divorce
case.

The money from the sale of the home went back into the

Trust Account.

There was no order against the Trust not to

sell.
5.

The five (5) acres in Enoch, Utah, were bought by the

Trust and deeded into the Trust.

The Trust paid the taxes,

insurance and for improvements.
6.

CATTLE OF DEFENDANT.

The original herd was trucked in

from Nevada, together with PATTY R. ENDRODY'S cattle, LES D.
ENDRODY'S cattle and ROBERT S. ENDRODY'S cattle.
In 1975, at the time of the marriage, Defendant owned two
hundred (200) cows, their one hundred eighty (180) calves, some
bulls and replacement heifers, and twenty (20) steers, on feed.
During the marriage, Defendant purchased several bulls.
These became marital assets.

The cow herd slowly diminished

during the marriage until the final sale when Defendant ran out
of feed and had no funds to buy any, and no hired help to feed
9

the animals.
Defendant asked his attorney to advise the trial court that
Defendant ran out of feed and had no funds to buy any.

The

attorney failed to do so but advised Defendant to sell.

Later

the attorney told Judge J. Philip Eves that it was his fault
they were sold.

The proceeds went to reducing debt and MICHAEL

ENDRODY'S medical bills.
As stated before, Plaintiff received $10,000.00 in cash and a
$10,000.00 Judgment to be paid to her by Defendant.
7.

EQUIPMENT ON THE FARM.

In 1970 when Defendant started

farming in Utah, he purchased $40,000 worth of equipment.

The

$40,000 came mainly from two (2) homes he sold in California.
The residue came from a previous marriage and from seven (7)
years of Defendant's service in Vietnam waters.
Defendant had a full set of farm equipment.

In 1975

During the

marriage it was upgraded and new equipment added.

Judge J.

Philip Eves divided the equipment.
In December 1993 after the trial, Plaintiff had a meeting
with Defendant.

Plaintiff assured Defendant that she had no

intention to appeal this divorce case and asked Defendant for
her equipment.
$43,000.00.

She sold the equipment in 1993 and netted

She promised to pay her rent and the one-half

(1/2) of the medical costs ordered by Judge Eves.

However,

once the equipment was sold, she did not pay anything as
promised.
10

8.

ENDRODY TRUCKING.

Defendant purchased a freightiiner and

two (2) hay trailers during the marriage in order to haul our
products to California.

To limit liability with the big truck,

the Trust formed Endrody Trucking, a Utah Corporation.
Trustee of Endrody Trucking became the President.
was one of the founding Directors.
51,000 shares for $51,000.00.

The

Plaintiff

Endrody Trust purchased

Defendant transferred the

freightiiner, the two trailers, an international cattle truck
and a 1984 Dodge with a snowplow.
16,000 shares.

Total value $16,000.00 for

Shares were divided as follows:

LASZLO ENDRODY, JR.
PLAINTIFF
MICHAEL A. ENDRODY
LINDA S. ENDRODY
LES D. ENDRODY
ROBERT S. ENDRODY
PATTY E. HEINZ

4,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000

Shares
Shares
Shares
Shares
Shares
Shares
Shares

Judge J. Philip Eves ordered Defendant to transfer one
thousand (1,000) shares to Plaintiff.

This way, Defendant will

have three thousand (3,000) shares and Plaintiff will have
three thousand (3,000 shares).

When PATTY HEINZ took over the

Endrody Trust as Trustee, in our annual meeting she
automatically took over as President of Endrody Trucking.
9.

ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT.

speak for itself.

The Antenuptial Agreement should

As noted in the trial court's Memorandum

Decision, the court analyzed the Antenuptial Agreement
carefully.

The court invalidated the provisions it thought

unfair and upheld the rest.
11

10.

RETIREMENT.

Defendant planned retirement long before he

was served with this divorce case.

Defendant held on to his

job until his third term as Secretary/Treasurer with 10 MM&P
Pilots Division, Panama Canal Pilots Branch, expired.
not seek re-election.

He did

The reasons for retirement were

explained at trial, and are set out below in Argument II.
11.

INCOME AND DEBT.

The statement that Plaintiff had no

medical insurance is not valid.

In Government Service she had

the choice to keep her insurance, subject to paying a premium,
the same as Defendant.

Plaintiff also received $10,000.00 in

cash from Defendant and another $10,000.00 was ordered to be
paid when Defendant can.

She has been paid $2,371.57 to date.

Plaintiff received during the case, cash
A Judgment for additional
For Attorney's fees
A Judgment for additional
A Judgment for additional
Plaintiff's half of the Equipment
The Trust-owned Cadillac
Plaintiff sold the Children's Piano
Plaintiff rented out the trust-owned home
Total

$10, 000
10, 000
5, 000
10, 000
850
34, 000
4,,000
1,,500
2,, 000
77,350

All of Plaintiff's medical bills were cleared up in 1990 in a
$50,000.00 loan that Defendant obtained from Captain Mark
McKim.

Defendant borrowed $10,000.00 from Endrody Trucking.

At the time of the trial, Defendant owed $29,000.00 to Endrody
Trust.
It is speculation on Mr. Park's part that:
(a)

Plaintiff will not receive anything out of her shares.
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She will receive just as much as Defendant from any dividends
that may be paid out in the future.
(b)

Defendant will resume as Trustee after this case is

finally put to rest.

The present Trustee is handling all of

her responsibilities in accordance with the Trust Agreement.
Why should any beneficiary request a change?

FALSE STATEMENTS IN PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF
1.

The statement that "the Defendant created an entity known

as the Endrody Trust of 1984" is a false statement.

The

Grantors created the Trust, not the beneficiaries.
2.

The statement that "the parties purchased three homes" is

a false statement.

The parties only purchased the Cedar City

house for MICHAEL and LINDA.
two.

The Trust purchased the other

At the time these houses were purchased, Defendant did

not make the kind of money that could have purchased three
homes in a relatively short period of time.
3.

The statement that "Plaintiff and Defendant accumulated

$800,000 in marital assets during 17 years of marriage" is
false.

This would be approximately $50,000.00 per year for the

sixteen years they were together.

It is a matter of record

that for the first two years of the marriage, Defendant made
$24,000.00 per year.

He purchased a house trailer for his

family (now worth $500.00).

The next two years he made

$38,000.00 per year, then $42,000.00 for two years.
13

Then for

two years there was a wage freeze for government workers during
Reagan's administration.
Defendant purchased the home for his children in Cedar City.
Defendant remodeled that home.

After 1979, Defendant

maintained two homes, one in Utah and one in Panama.

Defendant

purchased a 1978 Cordoba for Plaintiff and two new trucks for
Defendant.

Car in Panama.

The home in Utah was fully

furnished, as was the home in Panama.

Purchase of round-trip

airfare to Utah was made every ten (10) weeks.

Defendant

purchased a hay hauling truck, paid tremendous medical bills,
and purchased a new tractor.
senior pilot and he did farm.

Defendant made good money as a
However, since he was away seven

(7) months of the year, he paid more wages than normal to farm
workers, compared to farms where the owners were there.
Defendant upgraded equipment when necessary.
4.

The statement that "Plaintiff and Defendant took an

$80,000 piece of property and used the income from the
Defendant's employment over a period of 15 years to turn that
piece of property into an $437,000 asset which Defendant
treated as his own and knew that he would inherit".
all false.

This is

First, all of the $80,000.00 was in 1970 dollars.

That is half of the $437,000.00 in 1993.

The $437,000.00

includes the Grantors' home and all their improvements (about
$45,000.00 in 1970 dollars).

Most improvements were between

1970 and 1975.
14

Defendant could not have purchased three houses out of his
own wages in the time frame the houses were purchased in.

To

buy the 3 600 North house, a large down payment was required.
The Trustee picked up a loan on the now Trust-owned home on
1225 West, made the down payment and picked up a note for
$40,000.00 from seller at 10%.

The Trust then invested

$51,000.00 in Endrody Trucking.

MATILDA McGARVEY and BRUCE

McGARVEY deposited $22,000.00 into their Trust savings account.
Using most of the savings in the Trust accounts, the loan on
the 1225 West home was paid off.

Forty-eight thousand dollars

($48,000) was borrowed from Endrody Trucking.
home was purchased with a bank loan.
paid off.

The 408 Garden

The 3 600 North home was

The loan on the 4 08 and 5AC Enoch remained.

Trust then purchased 150 HP tractor and harvester.
acres was freed up.

Five (5)

One hundred (10 0) acre feet of water

rights was purchased for the Ranch.
system was purchased.

The

A Third Pivot sprinkling

The main line going to Third Pivot was

replaced from 6" to 8" main line for 3/4 miles.
taken out on 3600 North property.

A loan was

All of the above properties

were paid off except for the 408 Garden Park home.
After change of Trustee was made, the 408 Garden Park home
was sold and the Trust made a payment to Endrody Trucking.

The

loan on the 3600 North home still remains.
All of the above was covered in the depositions.
5.

The statement that "From the time of the purchase in 1970
15

until 1975 the time of the marriage, the Defendant did not make
more than $24,000.00 per year and did not have the funds to
increase the value of the farm property" is false.

This was

not covered at trial, but covered in the depositions.
Defendant made $38,000.00 per year as a Captain of the S.S. San
Juan and the S.S. San Pedro for Sea-Land Service, Inc.

This

figure is a three-year average.
When Defendant accepted a position with the Panama Canal
Company as a Panama Canal pilot, he took a $14,000.00-a-year
reduction in income.
6.

This is fact and not speculation.

The statement that "The yearly payments were made by

Defendant until the balance plus interest was paid in full on
the Ranch" is false.

LASZLO, SR., made the payment.

The

Defendant paid rent when the Trust was formed and leased the
Ranch.

Lease Agreement was in evidence.

All of the checks

used by LASZLO, SR., to pay of the Ranch were furnished during
the discovery process.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

Pursuant to Rule 24(h) of the Rules of Appellate

Procedure, Defendant adopts by reference Arguments I, II, and
III regarding the validity of the Endrody Trust and the
separate, non-marital, and non-divisible nature of the Trust
property.
16

II.

The detailed evidence shows that any imputation of

historical income to the Defendant would be wrong because
Defendant's reduction in employment and income is neither
voluntary nor temporary.

Accordingly, the trial judge's

decision to award Plaintiff alimony based on Defendant's
retirement income was not an abuse of discretion.
III.

The trial judge's rulings and acceptance of the

disposition of the proceeds from the sale of the cattle and of
the home should be presumed correct, inasmuch as Defendant made
no improper use of the income, and as Plaintiff has presented
an incomplete record on appeal in violation of Rule 11(e) (2) of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IV.

Plaintiff misstates the issue.

The trial court did not

find that the Antenuptial Agreement precluded Plaintiff from
receiving the assets of the marriage;

instead, it awarded

Plaintiff one-half of Defendant's shares in the Trust property.
Moreover, this is not a worthless award.

Plaintiff will

receive as much as Defendant from the Trust; they share equally
in its benefits.

In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has

upheld a similar award in the context of a farm partnership.
V.

The trial judge's decision to award Plaintiff only

partial attorney's fees cannot be said to be an abuse of
discretion because Plaintiff, in violation of Rule 11(e) (2) of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure, failed to set forth the
complete evidentiary record where the trial court considered
17

evidence on attorney's fees.

As a result, the Court should

presume that the trial judge made adequate findings and did not
abuse his discretion.
VI.

Defendant should not be forced to pay Plaintiff's

attorney's fees on appeal. Plaintiff has not provided a
complete record that refutes the trial judge's decision that
Plaintiff's need only warranted a partial award of attorney's
fees.

Moreover, Plaintiff's appeal is frivolous and misleading

and does not warrant an award to her of attorney's fees.

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION THAT THE ENDRODY TRUST IS A
VALID TRUST CONTAINING TRUST ASSETS AND NOT MARITAL
PROPERTY WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, RATIONALLY BASED,
AND NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Pursuant to Rule 24(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure, Defendant adopts by reference Arguments I, II,
and III made in the other Defendants/Appellees' brief entitled
"Brief of Respondents".

As explained in that Brief, the trial

court made detailed findings that the Endrody Trust was valid
and held its own separate property that was not marital
property subject to division.

The trial court's findings were

supported by the evidence, squarely within legal precedent, and
were not an abuse of its discretion.
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II.

THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT THE
DOCTRINE OF "IMPUTED INCOME" IS INAPPLICABLE AND THAT THE
TRIAL COURT IN NO WAY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
PLAINTIFF ALIMONY BASED ON DEFENDANT'S RETIREMENT INCOME

The trial court's decision to award Plaintiff alimony based
on Defendant's retirement income was not an abuse of discretion
because of the clear and uncontroverted evidence of Defendant's
age, declining physical health, difficult child care
responsibilities, and his current inability to farm.

In

contrast, the evidence shows that imputation of historical
income to defendant would be highly inappropriate because
Defendant's reduction in employment and income is neither
voluntary nor temporary.
Plaintiff relies on the case of Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963
(Utah App. 1994) (which Plaintiff incorrectly cited as 841 P.2d
722) to argue that the trial court should have imputed to
Defendant his "historical" income rather than his retirement
income.

However,

Plaintiff ignores the point noted by the

very case she cites:
first

the concept of imputed income requires

that "a finding is made that the parent is voluntarily

unemployed or underemployed".

869 P.2d at 965.

In Cox v. Cox,

877 P.2d 1262 (Utah App. 1994), the Court of Appeals emphasized
that "A court should not impute income for child or spousal
support until it first determines,

x

as a threshold matter,'

that income should be imputed because the [spouse] is
voluntarily

unemployed or underemployed."
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Id. at 1267 (citing

Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah App. 1993) (emphasis in
original).
Plaintiff states that the trial court "chose not to impute
income to the defendant in spite of overwhelming evidence that
the defendant was voluntarily under-employed."

(Brief of

Appellant at 21). However, Plaintiff never sets out this
"overwhelming" evidence.

The scattered "facts" that Plaintiff

supports through cites to the Trial Record deal with such
issues as Plaintiff's attempt to obtain a secretarial degree
and the list of medications Plaintiff takes.
however, does not

Plaintiff,

cite to facts that deal with the

voluntariness or involuntariness of Defendant's employment.
In addition, in assessing spousal support trial courts have
"appropriately relied on historical income rather than income
at the time of the divorce where a party
temporary decrease in income.'"

x

has experienced a

Cox, 877 P.2d at 1267 (citing

Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985).

Plaintiff has

advanced no facts that would show that Defendant's reduction in
income is only temporary.
In contrast, Defendant introduced solid evidence at trial
(and the trial court took this evidence into account in its
findings) that Defendant will not be able to return to his
previous line of work as a Panama Canal Pilot because of his
age, physical condition, and difficult child care
responsibilities.

In addition, because of the division and
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sale of the farm equipment, it is highly unlikely that
Defendant will be able to farm during retirement, as he had
hoped.

Thus, Defendant has introduced evidence that his

reduction in employment is not voluntary and that his reduction
in income is not temporary.
First, Defendant is 63 years old.
retirement.

He did not take an early

As a Panama Canal Pilot, he had an eighteen (18)

year retirement.

Defendant retired with nineteen (19) years

and eleven (11) months of service.
Second, Defendant's health has become a serious concern,
especially in light of Defendant's line of work.

Defendant has

had two heart attacks, and it is very risky boarding moving
ships and climbing pilot ladders (rope ladders).

In addition,

Defendant's eyes have deteriorated to the extent that it is
very hard for him to see in the distance down a lockwall 700
feet ahead, especially in a shadow effect.

Defendant, as a

senior pilot, was handling Pana-Max size ships 106 feet in beam
and driving these ships (mostly tankers) into a 110-foot wide
lock chamber.
vessel.

This gave him two feet on each side of the

This two feet looks like two inches, 700 feet ahead.

This is called tunnel vision.
chamber is concrete.

The vessel is steel and the lock

When steel, weighing 6 0,000 tons, comes

in contact with concrete, it makes sparks.

Tankers have fumes

on deck and could ignite and cause an explosion that Defendant,
the ship crew and lock workers may not survive.
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Defendant took an oath that he would step down when he could
not perform this job safely.
Mariner and a marine pilot.

Defendant is a licensed Master
Federal regulations do not permit

anyone to second-guess or question his decision to step down.
The same rules apply to airline pilots:

if they don't think

they can land that bird, they don't take off.
Defendant has only worked four (4) jobs at sea in the last
two (2) years.

One was for fifteen (15) days, one for twenty-

eight (28) days and two (2) jobs for thirty-five (35) days
each.

Defendant only worked these jobs in order to get the

additional medical coverage for his children.

They are now

covered until November of 1995.
Third, Plaintiff does not address Defendant's
uncontroverted evidence--nor the trial court's finding--that
Defendant's child care responsibilities seriously undermine his
ability to seek other employment at sea.

The trial court noted

that although Defendant hopes to return to work in the merchant
marine, he is "currently caring for and has temporary custody
of the two teenage children of the parties," and "Michael
[their son] is very ill."
to Brief of Appellant).

(Memorandum Decision, Addendum "A"

Defendant's daughter, Linda, has

tumors on her ovary and a tumor on her neck.
face an operation.

She will probably

Michael Endrody suffers from focal

segmental glomerulosclerosis.

This is a chronic inflammatory

disease of the kidneys that with time progresses to kidney
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failure.

Michael, now in Redding, California, is waiting for a

kidney transplant.
involved.

Plaintiff contributes nothing to the cost

Michael also suffers from Schizophrenia with

impaired judgment and communication.

He must have care.

Yet,

as the court found, Defendant's taking care of his children
"would create problems if he were to go back to sea as that
line of work requires lengthy absences."
Decision.)

(Memorandum

In addition, the court noted that "Plaintiff has

indicated that she is not interested in taking physical custody
of the children at this time."

(Memorandum Decision).

Plaintiff pushed Michael out of their home and refused to care
for him. Defendant tried to take Michael with him to Panama
after the invasion, but it didn't work out.

Defendant had to

care for Michael by hiring a maid to help with the care so
Defendant could work.
handle him.

The schools in the Canal Zone could not

After the decision was given by Commissioner

Lehman, Defendant had no money to pay the maid and had to let
her go.

Defendant could no longer commute to Utah.

son with him.

He had his

Defendant could no longer afford two (2) round-

trip air fares every ten (10) weeks.

Defendant had to stay

full-time in Panama with his son in school.

Defendant was

forced to give up farming.

Michael received $230.00 per month

Social Security from Utah.

He should have received $440.00,

but Plaintiff, out of spite, signed statements at Social
Security stating that the Endrody Trust is furnishing him free
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rent and food.

This is not true.

The Endrody Trust does not

furnish him with anything other than some supervision from
Trustee, PATTY HEINZ.

She resides in the Redding area.

Fourth, there comes a time that every working person must
retire.

In retirement most people make less money.

Aside from

the formidable obstacles Defendant faces in returning to work
at sea, Defendant will not be able to farm during his
retirement as he had hoped.
$1,000.00 per month.

Defendant planned to farm and make

However, the division of the farm

equipment has precluded Defendant from going back into farming.
That source of income is gone forever.
In summary, Defendant has reached (and passed) his age of
retirement.

His heart attacks and declining eyesight make it

unlikely that he can ever return to his previous line of work.
Going back to sea in the merchant marines will be extremely
difficult for him because he has physical custody of two
children, one with serious medical problems, and Plaintiff is
not interested in caring for them.

Finally, Defendant will not

be able to farm during his retirement as he had hoped.
In sum, the above facts, presented at trial, do not suggest
the "overwhelming" evidence of voluntary underemployment
Plaintiff claims.

Instead, this evidence indicates that the

trial court could have easily found that Defendant's drop in
employment and income resulted from his age, deteriorating
health, and onerous child care responsibilities and was
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anything but voluntary.

In addition, Defendant is now unable--

not unwilling--to farm, as he cannot farm without the necessary
equipment.

As a result, Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant

even meets the "threshold" finding of involuntariness required
for the application of the imputation of income doctrine.
877 P.2d at 1267.

Cox,

Moreover, the evidence indicates that

Defendant's decrease in income is not temporary, so that
imputation of historical income would be inappropriate.

Id.

In short, the trial court's decision to award Plaintiff alimony
from Defendant's retirement income was supported by clear and
detailed evidence and was in no way an abuse of discretion.

III.

DEFENDANT DID ACCOUNT FOR PROPERTY SOLD DURING THE
DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS

The trial court found the defendant in contempt of court for
selling the cattle, but seems to have found the disposition of
the proceeds from the cattle was made correctly.

Plaintiff has

failed to provide the appellate court with a complete
transcript of the trial court proceedings in which the trial
court made its finding that the Defendant's penalty for
contempt was to be $810, the amount of money that the court
found the Plaintiff reasonably incurred in costs and attorney's
fees.

The issue of the Defendant's penalty for contempt was

heard on November 29, 1993, an additional day of
trial/evidentiary hearing on the limited issues left unresolved
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by the trial court's Memorandum Decision.

The transcript of

this hearing, as contained in the trial record, contains only
the trial court Judge's rulings and excludes the presentation
of any evidence or any other proceedings before the court on
that date.
However, Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure requires that
[i]f the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding
or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the
evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a
transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or
conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated
to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant
portions of the transcript.
(emphasis added).

Plaintiff seems to be urging on appeal that

the trial court's penalty for contempt did not reflect the
proceeds from the sale of the cattle that Plaintiff ostensibly
lost,--i.e., that the trial court's treatment of the sale of
the cattle was "unsupported by or contrary to the evidence".
Therefore, Plaintiff should have included in the record a
transcript of the evidentiary hearings where any evidence on
this issue was heard.

Because Plaintiff did not provide a

complete or adequate record on appeal, this Court should
presume that the trial court's decisions regarding the sale of
the cattle were based on sufficient facts and evidence.

State

v. Rawlings, 829 P.2d 150 (Utah App. 1992); State v. $9,199.00,
791 P.2d 2213 (Utah App. 1990); Horton v. Gem State Mutual of
Utah, 794 P.2d 847 (Utah App. 1990; Sampson v. Richins, 770
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P.2d 998 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989).
Finally, even if Plaintiff's failure to provide an adequate
record could be ignored, the trial judge's decision can be
understood by the fact that Defendant's attorney told the trial
judge that it was his fault that the cattle were sold.
Defendant had asked his attorney to advise the trial court that
Defendant ran out of feed and had no funds to buy any.
attorney failed to do so but advised Defendant to sell.

The
Under

Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993), the Court of
Appeals may resonably imply any necessary findings which may
not have been stated by the trial court if the Court determines
that the trial court's findings do not provide adequate detail
or specificity.
Next, Plaintiff contends that the trial court's Findings of
Fact and Memorandum Decision did not account for the proceeds
of the home sold by the Trustee for the Endrody Trust.

Once

again, Rule 11(e)(2) of the Rule of Appellate Procedure
required Plaintiff to provide a complete record because of her
challenge of the evidence in this matter.
this.

Plaintiff did not do

However, Plaintiff's argument also fails because it was

not Defendant who sold the home or collected the proceeds.

The

Endrody Trust, a third party, owned the home, sold the home,
and received the proceeds.

As a result, Plaintiff herself has

received the proceeds from the sale of the home--they are
reflected in the value of the Trust shares she holds (which are
27

of equal value to the shares that the Defendant holds).

In

short, Plaintiff's demand that the trial court should have
asked the Defendant to account for the proceeds of the home is
misguided.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT DETERMINE THAT THE ANTENUPTIAL
AGREEMENT PRECLUDED PLAINTIFF FROM RECEIVING ASSETS
ACCUMULATED DURING THE MARRIAGE BUT INSTEAD MADE A VALID
AWARD TO PLAINTIFF OF ONE-HALF OF DEFENDANT'S SHARES IN
THE ENDRODY TRUST

Plaintiff's statement of this "issue" and its final position
misstates and blatantly ignores the detailed findings of the
trial court regarding the Antenuptial Agreement in its
Memorandum Decision.

The trial court did not determine that

the Antenuptial Agreement precluded the Plaintiff from
receiving assets during the marriage.

Instead, the trial court

invalidated provisions of the Agreement it found unfair and
divided the Trust shares accordingly.

Originally Defendant had

4,000 shares in Endrody Trucking and Plaintiff had 2,000; now
Plaintiff and Defendant each own 3,000 shares in Endrody
Trucking.
This is not a "worthless award".
much as Defendant from the Trust.

Plaintiff will receive as
Moreover, a similar award

was upheld by the Utah Supreme Court in the context of a
farming partnership where there was no market for the
fractional partnership interest awarded to the wife.

In Berry

v. Berry, 635 P.2d 68 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court
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reversed the trial court's decree that the husband should
purchase the wife's interest and that the wife should have a
judgment against the husband if he failed to do so.

The Utah

Supreme Court commended the trial judge's efforts to fashion a
means by which the wife's interest in the partnership might be
liquidated, recognizing that it would be beneficial to both
parties to have the wife entirely severed from the farming
operation.

However, the Court pointed out the lack of a market

for the fractional interest and the unfairness of creating a
burden for the husband because of his financial condition.

The

Court also rejected the Plaintiff's suggestion that the husband
persuade the other partners to sell a portion of the land.

"We

commend that suggestion to the defendant but cannot impose it
upon him as an obligation inasmuch as under our partnership
laws . . . neither plaintiff nor defendant can force a sale of
specific partnership property."

Id. at 70.

Similarly, the Plaintiff in the instant case was awarded a
fractional interest in separate Trust property.

As noted in

Respondents' Brief, the evidence indicates that the Endrody
Trust is a valid trust that has met the required formalities
and has conducted its affairs separately from the affairs of
Defendant.

Accordingly, neither Plaintiff nor Defendant

can

force the court to invalidate or set aside the Trust or force a
sale of Trust property.

As noted in 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and

Separation, § 896 (1983), "[sjome property ostensibly owned by
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divorcing spouses may not be divisible because it is neither
marital nor separate property but is the property of a third
person."
In contrast to Plaintiff's contention, Defendant does not
control the trust; he is a beneficiary of the Trust and is the
owner of certain shares, subject to the provisions of the Trust
agreement (as is Plaintiff).

As a result, this case should be

governed by the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Berry.
The Court held that it was inequitable to require the husband
to purchase the wife's interest, and stated that if and when
the defendant husband's salary materially increased (or his
debts reduced), the trial court under its continuing
jurisdiction could reexamine the problem.

Berry, 635 P.2d at

70.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES TO PLAINTIFF
SHOULD BE PRESUMED SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE EVIDENCE
Plaintiff's brief suggests that the trial court did not

support its discretionary award of attorney's fees to Plaintiff
with adequate findings.

However, once again Plaintiff has

failed to provide the appellate court with a complete
transcript of the necessary trial court proceedings pursuant to
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence,
the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all
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evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the
court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's
deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the
transcript.
The issue of attorney's fees also came on November 29, 1993,
the additional day of trial/evidentiary hearing on the limited
issues left unresolved by the trial court's Memorandum
Decision.

The transcript of this hearing, as contained in the

trial record, contains only the trial court Judge's rulings and
excludes the presentation of any evidence or any other
proceedings before the court.
If Plaintiff wished to urge on appeal that the trial court's
award of attorney's fees was "unsupported by or contrary to the
evidence," Plaintiff was required to include in the record a
transcript of the evidentiary hearings where any evidence on
attorney's fees was heard.

Because Plaintiff did not provide a

complete or adequate record on appeal, this Court should
presume that the trial court's ruling as to attorney's fees was
based on sufficient facts and evidence.

State v. Rawlinqs, 829

P.2d 150 (Utah App. 1992); State v. $9,199.00, 791 P.2d 2213
(Utah App. 1990); Horton v. Gem State Mutual of Utah, 794 P.2d
847 (Utah App. 1990; Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah
App.), cert, denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989).
Next, Plaintiff's Brief attempts to make much of the fact
that "most" of the interim orders were attributable to
Defendant.

As an example, Plaintiff insinuates that Defendant
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unreasonably attempted to evict her from the "family home."
Plaintiff does not mention that the Trust owned the home, that
Plaintiff had failed to make rental payments to the trust that
were needed to make the payments on the home, nor that
Plaintiff had rented out part of the trust-owned home for her
own benefit.

Thus, Defendant's actions were hardly

"unwarranted" conduct, as Plaintiff claims.

VI.

PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL

Plaintiff requests attorney's fees on appeal, citing a need
for attorney's fees established at the trial level.

However,

as noted in Argument V, Plaintiff has not provided the Court
with a complete record, so that it is impossible to tell what
evidence the trial court relied on below in its decision to
award attorney's fees.

Moreover, Plaintiff's Brief has been so

twisted and loaded with false statements and outright
speculation that it cannot possibly warrant any more attorney's
fees to be taken from Defendant.
fourth year.

This lawsuit is now in its

The divorce took thirty minutes.

as his own attorney throughout the trial.

Defendant acted

Plaintiff had two

attorneys and expects Defendant to pay for them.

Any more fees

of any kind would drive this Defendant into bankruptcy.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the facts of this case, the foregoing arguments, and
the evidence presented to the trial court, Defendant
respectfully requests that the Utah Court of Appeals affirm the
decision of the Fifth Judicial District Court, as reflected by
the trial court's Memorandum Decision, its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and the Judgment and Decree.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

fchi^O^r/

day of June, 1995.
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LASZLO .ENDRODY, JR . ,
Pro S e / D e f e n d a n t / A p ^ ^ l l e e
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